Incentives in religious performance: a stochastic dominance approach by García-Muñoz, Teresa
 1 
Incentives in Religious Performance: a Stochastic 
Dominance Approach 
Teresa García-Muñoz1 
Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos para la Economía y la Empresa 
GLOBE: Universidad de Granada 




Using a stochastic dominance approach in an international dataset 
of about 10,000 Catholic subjects, we show that incentives (based on 
absolute belief) play a crucial role in religious practice (church 
attendance and prayer). Furthermore, we find that when both positive 
(heaven) and negative (hell) incentives are available, the former have a 
much stronger effect than the latter. The results are confirmed using 
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1. Introduction 
Many studies have examined the role of incentives and their effect on the behavior 
of individuals (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991; Slonim & Roth, 1998; Andreoni, Harbaugh 
& Vesterlund, 2003; Nikiforakis, 2008; among others). In this study, the interest falls on 
the effect of incentives on religious behavior in the sense that they increase (decrease) 
individual religious performance. 
Religious practice can be encouraged by two types of incentives: earthly ones and 
afterlife ones. 
o Earthly incentives. These incentives are associated with social or prfessional 
rewards (Azzi & Ehrenberg, 1975). Economic speculations suggest that 
subsidies for religious schools, favorable tax schemes for the religious sector, or 
the social recognition of neighbors could encourage religious activity. 
Furthermore, churches are good places to build social links and increase 
professional opportunities, therefore encouraging chur h-attendance. 
o Afterlife incentives. This type of incentive is linked to rewards in the afterlife, 
that is, rewards that will be obtained after death. Individuals may view their 
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expected afterlife consumption as being related to their current participation in 
church related activities (attendance, prayer, financial religious contributions and 
others). Individual beliefs on afterlife probabilities play a crucial role in this 
earthly investment. 
This paper addresses the second group. Previous studies have analyzed the effects of 
“afterlife incentives” on religious behavior. Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975) were the first to 
propose a theoretical model of afterlife religious capital. They analyze the determinants 
of individuals’ participation in religious activities using a utility-maximizing model. 
Among other results, they found afterlife beliefs to be a major determinant of church 
attendance. Using several surveys carried out in the United States, they provided 
empirical support for their theory.  
Blomberg et al. (2006) developed a model where financial religious contributions 
are motivated by both current consumption and afterlife considerations. They show that 
afterlife considerations play an important role in explaining financial religious 
contributions. 
Pyne (2008) studies the relationship between religios ty and the fear of death. He 
found that individuals who place a higher probability on the existence of an afterlife 
will rationally invest more in religious capital.  
Recently, Brañas-Garza et al. (2009) estimated the role of afterlife beliefs in the 
production of religious commodities, concretely church attendance and prayer. They 
found that afterlife beliefs are crucial determinants but, more importantly, they found 
that beliefs in heaven are much more relevant than beliefs in hell (positive incentives are 
stronger than negative ones). In order to contribute to the robustness of the estimated 
(regression) effects of the positive/negative incentiv s in the Brañas-Garza et al. study 
(2009), an additional statistical analysis is applied and presented in this paper. 
Using a stochastic dominance approach, we show that afterlife incentives play a 
crucial role in religious performance, comparing positive versus negative incentives.  
The study was carried out on Catholic people. In the Catholic religion, church 
attendance and prayer are strategies that lead to heaven and prevent hell. Church 
attendance and prayer are two dimensions of religiosity that reflect public religious 
activities versus private/intimate prayer activities. While church attendance also has 
non-religious motives such as networking and the building of social ties, private prayer 
activity has more pure religious motives. 
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Using a stochastic dominance approach, we explore if absolute beliefs in eternal 
bliss (heaven) and in eternal damnation (hell) increase individual’s religious investment 
as reflected in church attendance and prayer, and if absolute belief in eternal damnation 
(hell) is a more or less powerful incentive compared to eternal bliss (heaven) for 
intensified religious effort.  
 
2. Sample and variables used in the study 
The data were drawn from the module on National Identity of the 1998 International 
Social Survey Program (ISSP): Religion II. The survey contains questions about attitude 
and beliefs, specifically:  
o “How often do you attend religious services at a chur ?”  This question has six 
options: (1) never; (2) once a year; (3) two or three times a year; (4) once a 
month; (5) two or three times a month; and (6) at le st once a week.  
o “How often do you pray?” This question has eleven alternative categories: (1) 
never; (2) once a year; (3) twice a year; (4) a few times a year; (5) about once a 
month; (6) two or three times a month; (7) almost every week; (8) every week; 
(9) several times a week; (10) once a day; and (11) several times a day.  
o “Do you believe in life after death?” 
o “Do you believe in heaven?” 
o “Do you believe in hell?”  
The last three questions have the same four options: (1) yes, definitely; (2) yes, 
probably; (3) no, probably not; and (4) no, definitely not. 
The promise of an afterlife serves as an incentive for believers to engage in religious 
behavior. Those who definitely believe in heaven are confident that they will be highly 
rewarded, thus belief in heaven can be considered a positive incentive (with p=1). On 
the opposite side, those who definitely believe in hell are confident that they will be 
highly punished after death. Therefore, belief in hell can be considered a negative 
incentive (with p=1). 
After excluding respondents who did not answer some f the questions, the final 
dataset was comprised of about 10,840 Catholic subjects. The following table shows 
their distribution of beliefs: 
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     Table 1. Distributions of beliefs for Catholics (%) 
 Afterlife Heaven Hell 
Yes, definitely 35.77 34.73 25.72 
Yes, probably 33.43 31.78 25.84 
No, probably not 13.77 15.71 21.88 
No, definitely not 17.02 17.78 26.56 
 
Table 1 reveals that afterlife incentives are important (the largest category is shown 
in bold). As can be seen, individuals are concerned with what happens after death, 
although the people that believe in a reward (heaven) are much more numerous than 
those who believe in a punishment (hell). On averag, subjects are optimistic regarding 
afterlife outcomes. 
As regards beliefs about heaven and hell, Table 2 show  the contingency table of the 
responses by 10,840 subjects.  
Table 2. 
  “Do you believe in hell?”  











2,726 423 239 377 3,765 
Yes, 
probably 
46 2,347 657 395 3,445 
No, probably 
not 






11 6 11 1,899 1,927 
  2,788 2,801 2,372 2,879 10,840 
 
Since we only focus on people who definitely believe or definitely do not believe 
(that is, the subjects appearing in bold in Table 2), the sample is reduced to 5,013 
subjects.  
Hence, we define a 2×2 factors design according to the type of incentives affecting 
subjects. As shown in Table 2 (in bold), we have: 
o Respondents affected by oth types of incentives: positive and negative. They 
definitely believe in heaven (positive) and hell (negative). [n=2,726] 
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o Respondents with positive incentives only. They definitely believe in heaven, 
but do not believe in hell at all. [n=377] 
o Respondents with no incentives. They do not believe in heaven or hell at all. 
[n=1,899] 
o Respondents with negative incentives only. They definit ly believe in hell, but 
do not believe in heaven at all. Due to the small size of this group, it has been 
dropped. [n=11] 
Using a stochastic dominance approach and the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, we 
compare individual religious performance (church attendance and prayer) according to 
the type of incentive affecting each person. Basically, we compare the respondents with 
both types of incentives versus respondents with only positive incentives versus 
respondents with no incentives. 
 
3. Stochastic dominance  
Stochastic dominance is an abbreviated term for first-o der stochastic dominance, 
which refers to a set of relations that may hold betwe n a pair of distributions. 
Stochastic dominance is usually applied to the analysis of income distribution and 
income inequality. The concept can, however, be applied in many other domains. 
Concretely, we can study the effectiveness of several incentives on church attendance 
and prayer using the stochastic dominance relation between the distributions of these 
two variables generated by these incentives.  
In order to determine whether a relation of stochastic dominance holds between two 
distributions, the distributions are first characteriz d by their Cumulative Distribution 
Functions (CDF). For instance, in the previous section we saw that the question about 
church attendance has 6 response levels ranging from “never (1)” to “at least once a 
week (6)”. For a given sample, the value of the CDF at level a is the proportion of 
subjects in the sample that do not go to church more than a.  
Suppose we find the following “radical” situation. We have two different samples of 
subjects. The people in the first sample are not so religious (in terms of church 
attendance), while in the second sample, subjects attend church very frequently. The 
relative frequencies and CDFs for each level of chur  attendance for both samples are 
presented in Table 3: 
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    Table 3.  
 Sample 1 Sample 2 
 % CDF (F1) % CDF (F2) 
Never (1) 33.33 33.33 0 0 
Once a year (2) 33.33 66.67 0 0 
2 or 3 times a year (3) 33.33 100 0 0 
Once a month (4) 0 100 33.33 33.33 
2 or 3 times a month (5) 0 100 33.33 66.67 
At least once a week (6) 0 100 33.33 100 
  
Clearly, the second sample contains subjects who engage in religious practices with 
greater frequency. Figure 1 shows the cumulative distribution functions of these two 
samples.        
 
Let us now introduce the concept of stochastic dominance. 
Definition 1 
Suppose that we consider two distributions A and B, characterized respectively by 
the cumulative distribution functions FA and FB. Then distribution B dominates 
distribution A stochastically (at the first order) if, for any argument a, ( ) ( )B AF a F a≤ .   
In our example, inequality is2 1( ) ( ),F a F a a≤ ∀ , that is, the distribution of church 
attendance in the second sample stochastically dominates (is always below) the 
distribution in sample 1. This means that the propotion of subjects in each level in 2F  
is always less than or equal to the proportion of subjects in each level in 1F . 
In other words, sample 2 is formed by more religious people (in terms of church 
attendance) than sample 1. For this reason we say that the second sample “dominates” 
the first one since sample 2 has more subjects in the upper categories of the ordinal 
variable we are studying (church attendance)2. 
In the next section we use this approach to explore the effect of incentives on 
religious performance. 
 
4. Incentives on religious performance 
In Section 2 we selected 5,002 Catholic subjects who definitely believe or definitely  
do not believe in heaven and hell. The subjects have been divided into three samples 
according to what types of incentives (beliefs) affect them: people affected by both 
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incentives (heaven and hell), people affected by the positive incentive only (heaven) and 
people with no incentives. In Tables 4 and 5, the CDFs of church attendance and prayer 
are given for the three samples: 







 % CDF % CDF % CDF 
Never (1) 5.47 5.47 12.20 12.20 29.54 29.54 
Once a year (2) 7.41 12.88 13.79 25.99 27.70 57.24 
2 or 3 times a year (3) 13.06 25.94 19.89 45.89 25.33 82.57 
Once a month (4) 6.16 32.10 8.75 54.64 4.42 86.99 
2 or 3 times a month (5) 14.27 46.37 15.65 70.29 5.79 92.79 
At least once a week (6) 53.63 100 29.71 100 7.21 100 
 







 % CDF % CDF % CDF 
Never (1) 2.83 2.84 7.73 7.73 36.20 36.20 
Once a year (2) 1.07 3.91 1.07 8.80 7.11 43.31 
Twice a year (3) 1.70 5.60 1.33 10.13 9.82 53.13 
A few times a year (4) 4.65 10.25 7.20 17.33 12.26 65.39 
About once a month (5) 2.47 12.72 4.27 21.60 4.19 69.58 
Two or three times a month (6) 3.50 16.22 4.00 25.60 4.99 74.57 
Almost every week (7) 5.38 21.61 5.60 31.20 4.19 78.7  
Every week (8) 9.81 31.41 11.73 42.93 4.14 82.91 
Several times a week (9) 16.00 47.42 15.47 58.40 5.15 88.06 
Once a day (10) 34.88 82.30 31.47 89.87 9.87 97.93 
Several times a day (11) 17.70 100 10.13 100 2.07 100 
 
Figures 2 and 3 show the cumulative distribution fuctions. In both figures, the 
"both incentives" distribution was found to stochastically dominate the "no incentives" 
and “positive incentives” distributions. Moreover, the “positive incentives” distribution 
stochastically dominates the “no incentives” distribut on. At all attendance and prayer 
levels, the CDF values of “both incentives” are smaller than the CDF values of the other 
two samples. As we explained in Section 3, this means that there is a higher proportion 
of practicing subjects (church attendance and prayer) among people who are affected by 
negative and positive incentives than in the other groups. 
The differences between distributions can be statistically corroborated using the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test3. In the next table we present the statistics and significance of 
                                                
3 The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a nonparametric test o compare two samples. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic quantifies a distance between the distribution functions of two samples. The null 
distribution of this statistic is calculated under the null hypothesis that the samples are drawn from the 
same distribution. 
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this test to compare the distributions of church attendance and prayer among the three 
samples: 
    Table 6. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests 
 Attendance distributions Prayer distributions 
 Positive incentives only Positive incentives only 
Both incentives  0.2392 (0.000) 0.1152 (0.000) 
No incentives  0.3668 (0.000) 0.4898 (0.000) 
    p-values in parentheses 
In sum, we find that:  
(i) The effects of “both (positive and negative) incentives” are different from 
“positive incentives only”;  
(ii)  The effects of “positive incentives only” are different from “no incentives”.  
Furthermore, the positive incentives effect is large, whereas the negative incentives 
effect is smaller. We obtain this result by comparing the net effects of “both incentives” 
versus the net effect of “positive incentives only”. When we remove the “negative 
incentives” effect, that is, when we jump from the “both incentives” sample to the 
“positive incentives” sample, attendance and prayer distributions are closer than when 
we remove the “both incentives” effect, that is, when we jump from the “positive 
incentives” sample to the “no incentives” sample. This can be viewed graphically in 
Figures 2 and 3 and by numerically calculating the mean differences between the CDF 
values. 
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The “positive incentives” effect is stronger for prayer than for attendance 
distribution. When we only remove the “negative ince tives” effect (jumping from the 
“both incentives” sample to the “positive incentives” sample), the behavior of the prayer 
distribution is similar in both samples (the MD betw en both CDFs is 7.93). 
 
5. Conclusions 
Using a stochastic dominance approach and a dataset of 10,840 Catholic subjects, 
we have illustrated that incentives have a major effect on religious behavior and that 
positive incentives have a much stronger effect than negative ones when both types of 
incentives are available. This result is similar to the one proposed in the cooperation 
experiments described in Andreoni et al. (2003) and contributes to the robustness of the 
estimated effects of positive/negative religious ince tives in Brañas-Garza et al. (2009). 
Therefore we may conclude that: 
1) Positive and negative incentives have a crucial effect on decisions. 
2) The size of positive incentives is much larger than the size of negative 
incentives. 
In sum, our study supports the pronounced effectiveness of positive rewards, but 
finds no large effects for punishment. Hence we mayconclude that the Catholic Church 
could be much more successful in their performance (aggregate behavior) if it were to 
promote heavensward activities rather than the fear of God. 
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